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Inflexible Relative Prices and Price Level Inertia
Abstract
A decrease in aggregate demand at given prices and wages decreases
output and employment. The decrease in employment exerts downward pressure
on real wages. The decrease in production exerts downward pressure on mark
ups. With perfectly synchronized price and wage decisions, nominal wages
and prices decrease instantaneously until equilibrium is re—established
at a lower price level and the initial relative prices. If, however, price
and wage decisions are asynchronized, this process cannot take place
instantaneously but rather takes place over time. If real wages and mark
ups are rather insensitive to shifts in demand, the process of adjustment
is slow, the effects of money on output are strong and lasting.
The paper formalizes this intuitive argument and characterizes the







(617) 495—2119Asynchronization of price decisions is a pervasivecharacteristic
of decentralized economies. Macroeconomists have recently concentrated
on a particular set of price decisions, namely contract wage decisions
which are both set in nominal terms for long periods of time arid staggered
over time across contracts (Taylor (1980] for example). Asynchronization
is, however, not limited to contract wages. Most prices, except for those
determined in exchange or asset markets, are set for discrete periods of
time, ranging from a few days to a few months. These price decisions are
not all taken at the same time but spread through time rather uniformly.
As in the case of imperfect information, we have to decide whether
asynchronization is a deviation from the standard frictionless model
we may safely ignore or a deviation we want to build on to explain fluctua-
tions. In a previous paper •(Blarichard (1983]), I have shown that even if
all price decisions are taken for short periods of time, but if the number
of price decisions is large, asynchronization will lead to substantial
pricelevel inertia. This suggests that asynchronization may indeed help
explain price level inertia and thus generate macroeconomic fluctuations.
This paper goes further and addresses the following question: In the
presence of asynchronization, how is the degree of price level inertia
related to slopes of demand and supply curves in the various markets? The
paper derives a relation between inflexibility of relative prices and inertia
of nominal prices. More precisely, it argues that the less sensitive relative
prices are to shifts in demand, the more slowly will nominal prices adjust
tooffset aggregate demand disturbances.
Therestof the paper is spent deriving, explaining andqualifying
this result. Itisorganized in four sections. Thefirstsets up the
model butmaintainsthe assumption of synchronization of price decisions.—2—
The second introduces asynchronization and derives the relation between
relative price inflexibility and price level inertia. The third examines
the relation of the model to both "disequilibrium" models and to the "price
wage mechanism" (Tobin t1970]) which underlies much of the empirical work
on prices and wages. The fourth extends the initial model to allow for a
larger menu of inputs and outputs: its purpose is to characterize the joint
movement of relative and nominal prices in response to nominal disturbances.
Until then, the time structure of price decisions is taken as given. Whether
asynchronization may be stable if price setters are free to choose the timing
of price decisions is discussed in the conclusion.—3—
SectionI. A Simple Model
The simplest model must have one relative price and thus two
nominal prices. Consider the following:
S —l
2.= b(w—p) ;b>0 (1)
=c(m—p) ;c>0 (2)
y=ai ;a [0,1] (3)
p=w ifa=l
=(a/(l—a))(p—w) if a <1 (4)
=(11(1-a))(p-w)if a < 1 (5)
Allvariables areinlogarithms; 2.andydenote labor andoutput
respectively; m, w andpare nominal money, the nominal wage and the nominal
priceof output respectively. Labor supply is an increasing function of
the real wage, output demand an increasing function of real money balances.
Output is produced from labor with constant or decreasing returns to scale.
The implied notional demand for labor and supply of output are given by (4)
and (5). Constant terms are deleted from all equations for notational
simplicity.
The competitive equilibrium is simply w =p=mand y =£=0.
How is it reached? Asynchronization of price decisions presupposes the
existence of price setters. Thus, before introducing asynchronization,
we must introduce an explicit price setting mechanism:
The nominal wage is determined in the labor market given the
nominalprice. The nominal price is determinedin the goods market
given the nominal wage. To avoid issues of monopoly or monopsony power—4—
whichareinessential to this argument, both wages andpricesare assumed
to be set competitively. Thus, although we shall think of workers as
setting nominal wages and firms as setting nominal prices, who actually
sets them in each market is irrelevant.
The supply and demand expressed in each market depend on the
constraints perceived by agents in the other markets. It is assumed that
if a market does not clear at the prevailing wage price pair, the outcome
is demand determined; demand is therefore never constrained.
We can now characterize the wage and price relations, and the
equilibrium. Suppliers of labor choose the nominal wage so that the
supply of labor equals the derived demand for labor by firms:
(w-p)=a1y=a1c(m-p) >
w-p=a1cb(m-p) or (6)
w =Op+(l-O)m;0=1-acb ,0<1. (7)
Thenominal wage is a linear combination of the price level aridnominal
money. The effect of the price level isa priori ambiguous: an increase in
theprice level decreases aggregate demand and the derived demand for labor,
requiring a decrease in the real wage. The lower real wage and the higher
price level imply that the nominal wage may increase or decrease. 0 is
the first important parameter for what follows. Note that if labor supply
is very elastic, i.e. if b is very small, 0 is close to unity.
Suppliers of output choose the nominal price of output so that the
supply of output equals the demand for output. As by assumption, they
are never constrained in their demand for labor, output supply is notional
supply:—5-.
(a/ (1-a)) (p-w) =c(m-p) >
—l p-w =ca(1—a) (in-p) (8)
pw +(l—G)In; a/(a+(1—a)c),cC(0,1] (9)
The price of output is a linear combination of the nominal wage and
nominalmoney. cisthe second important parameter in what follows. Note
that if returns to scale are nearly constant, so that notional supply is
very elastic, a is close to unity and so is 0.
Thewageandprice loci are drawn inFigure 1. The wagerelation
has slope 0, the price relation has slope cY1. Equilibrium requires
that both relations hold, thus that y == 0andw =p=m.The specific
price setting assumptions may affect the way in which the equilibrium
is attained but do not affect the equilibrium values of quantities
andprices.Money is neutral; neutrality clearly does not depend on the
valuesof 0 and0.
Itis useful for later reference to give a heuristic description
of how this equilibrium may be reached through a tatonnement typeprocess.
Suppose that nominal money increases, so that in Figure 1, the initial
equilibrium is at A andthenew equilibrium at E: At initial values of
w andp,aggregate demand increases, increasing output andemployment.
Workers,therefore, want a higher real wage. Given p, they want to go
to point B. Firms want a higher mark up; given w, they want to go to
point B'. These two claims, of a higher real wage and of a higher
mark up, are clearlyinconsistent. Attempts byboth firms and workers
to increase relative prices lead to increases in nominal prices and
wages. This process ends when real money balances are back totheir











aridequilibrium is reached. A possible path of adjustment in which wages
and prices adjust in turn is ABC.. .E in Figure i..—8—
Section II. Asynchronization of Price and Wage Decisions
Most nominal prices are set for discrete periods of time. For
each such period, price setters prefer the simplicity of a constant nominal
price to a predeterminedbut not necessarily constant —pricepath
or to contingent price paths. Moreover, nominal price changes do not
take place simultaneously but rather take place at a fairly uniform
rateover time.
We shall for the moment take these facts as given and return later
to what may determine the timing of price decisions by price setters.
We formalize them in the following mechanical but convenient way:
Price decisions are taken every two periods, at even times. Thus
prices are set at time t for periods t, t+l, and SO Ofl.Wage decisions
are taken every two periods, at odd times, thus at t-l for t-l and t,
andso on. Again, the unitperiodshould be thought of as fairly short,
of the order of a month, so that after two months all price and wage
decisions have been freely revised.
Price decisior.s are now given by:
1 1
p (c w + (1 )m)+ (a t
=
2 t—l
- E(wIt)+(l-)E(mt)) t+l t+l (10)
E(.jt) denotes the expectation of a variable conditional on informa-
tion available at time t. Pt denotes the price chosen at t for t and t+1;
similarly w1 denotes the wage chosen at t-l for t-l and t and is therefore
the wage still prevailing at t. Equation (10) is the natural extension of
(9);it states that the nominal price is a weighted average of its market
clearing value at t, which depends on the currentnominal wage and money,
andof its expected market clearing value at t+l which depends on expected
1
nominalwage and money. Weights are assumed equal for simplicity: discounting—9-
would not substantially affect the results. Equation (10) implies that for
each interval during which the nominal price is fixed, the expected average
mark up is an increasing function of expected average demand.
In a similar way, wage decisions are given, at t—l for example, by:
wi = (0 + -(0E(pJt-l)+ (l_®)E(mtlt_l)) (11)
The nominal wage set at time t-l for t-l andtis a weighted average
of its market clearing value at t-l and its expected market clearing value
for t. Equation (11) implies that for each interval during which the
nominal wage is fixed, the expected average real wage is an increasing
function of expected average aggregate demand.
The dynamic behavior of the economy is now characterized by equations
(10) and (11), and a specification of the money process. The system is
solved for a general money process in the appendix; in the text I focus on
the effects of an unanticipated permanent increase in money. It is a
counterfactual experiment but one which shows most clearly the dynamics
of the system.
The Adjustment of the Price Level
Starting from steady state, nominal money increases at time t =0,
from zero to unity (by appropriate normalization). This increase is
unanticipatedand permanent. What are the effects on prices over time?
The answer iseasyto derive under the assumption of static expecta-




Pt =00t-2 + (1—a®) ;t =2,4,...—10—
At time t =0,after the increase in money, wages have not yet
increased: firmsincreasetheir nominal price only to the extent they
want to increase their mark up to supply the higher level of output.
Under constant returns, there is no increase in prices, as (5 =1.At
time t =1,wages increase both because prices are higher and because,
unless 0 =1,a higher real wage is required to supply a higher level of
labor. Under static expectations, the degree of price inertia is given by
oE and adjustment thus is slower, the more inflexible real wages and mark ups.
Under rational expectations, the price level path is given instead
by (see appendix):
p0 =1—(5(1—-0(l+X))
, 0<p0 <1—A (13)
Pt =t—2+ (1—A) ; t =2,4,...
where A (l_(l_G®)l/2)/(l+(l_aG)1/2)
A<cs0 ;A=Oifcs0=0 ,X=lifa0=l
The initial jump in nominal prices is larger than under static
expectations. The degree of persistence, or inertia, is now given by
A rather than cy0.A is an increasing function of (50, but smaller than
cr0. That the adjustment should be faster underrationalexpectations is
obvious: at time t =0for example, price setters take into account not
only the current increase in demand, but also the forthcoming increase in
nominal wages at t =1.Along the path, price and wage setters take account
not only of demand and current wages or prices but also of expected increases
in prices and wages. Although the adjustment is faster under rational
expectations, there is still a direct relation between relative price
inflexibility, measured byand 0, anc nominal price inertia, measured by A.—11—
Table 1
The Effects of An Increase in Money on Relative andNominalPrices
=.99 0= .99
*Averagereal wage :average value for the two period interval during
which the nominal wage is fixed.
**Averagemarkup:average value for the two period interval during which


















































































Piflexampleof a path or adjustment, for=0=.99is given in Table 1.
Relative Prices During the Adjustment Process
We start with a puzzle. After the increase in money, price setters
desire a higher mark up, wage setters a higher real wage. Under static
expectations, both sides fail to take into account future movements in
either prices or wages and are therefore systematically disappointed.
This cannot happen under rational expectations; in particular, as there is
no unanticipated movement in money after t =0,the rational expectation
path is a perfect foresight path. Thus, as equations (10) and (11) hold
for actual values of wages and prices, workers must, for every interval
during which nominal wages are fixed, obtain a higher real wage; firms
must also, for every interval during which nominal prices are fixed, obtain
a higher mark up. How can these be consistent?
Table 1 shows that they can indeed be consistent (the algebra is
derived in the appendix). They can be consistent because the two intervals
described above do not coincide but overlap: There is then a path of
increases in nominal prices and wages such that in turn the average mark
up and real wage are higher. This paradoxical path is the result of the
assumption of rational expectations; the relevant result is not this paradox
but the fact that there exists a rational expectation path.
The other and directly related characteristic of the process of
adjustment is that there is no persistent deviation of the real wage from
its equilibrium value: The real wage simply oscillates around this value
during the path of adjustment.—13—
The two paths of adjustment, under static and rational expectations
are represented in Figure 2, the static expectation path by the dotted
line,the rational expectation path by the thick line. Note that the
average wage (denoted by )isalways on the w(p) locus, the average
mark up (p) always on the p(w) locu.s.
To summarize, movements in money create, at the initial pair
of prices and wages, desired changes in relative prices. After an
increase in money,both relative prices (the realwage arid its inverse,
the mark up) are too low; after a decrease in money, they are both too
high. As workers and firms in turn re—establish their desired relative
prices, nominal prices adjust until aggregate demand returns to its
equilibriumvalue. Ifrelative prices are relatively inflexible, the








Section III. Output Fluctuations and Disequilbriuxn
The model developed above generates output and employment fluctuations
in response to movements in aggregate demand. Can it be seen as providing
price dynamics for "disequilibrium" models, models in which agents
face sustained quantity constraints (Barro Grossman [1972] for example)?
Pn obvious but unimportant difference is the assumption of demand
determination used here as opposed to the minimum rule used in these
models. Let's restrict ourselves to the case of a decrease in nominal
money, for which output decreases under either demand determination or
a minimum rule. A major difference still remains. In disequilibrium
models, a decrease in money generates a decrease in output and a regime
of "Keynesian" unemployment (Malinvaud [1977]). As long as this regime
prevails, firms sell less output than they would like at the prevailing
mark up, workers sell less labor than they would like at the prevailing
real wage. There are therefore sustained quantity constraints. This is
not the case, however, in the model developed here. Although a decrease
in moneyalso decreases outputand employment, relative pricesalong the
path of adjustmentwere shown in the previous section to be such that
onaverage firms do not feel constrained in the amount of output they
sell and workers do not feel constrained in the amount of labor they
supply.2'3Thereis no equivalent in this model of a sustained period
of"Keynesian" unemployment. Asynchronization of price decisions generates
fluctuations but not "disequilibrium".
Further deviations from the standard model are needed to obtain
disequilibrium. Suppose for example that the wage, instead of being
determined in a spot market, is given by contracts which specify a constant
real wage at any level of employment, even if spot labor supply is an—16--
increasingfunction of the real wage. Suppose alternatively that firms
adopta price rule which specifies price as a function of standard unit
costs, even if marginal cost is an increasing function of the level of
production.(Why such rules might be chosen is still thesubject of much
researchand very much an unsettled issue. See for example Azariadis (1975]
and Green-Kahn (1983] for derivations of such real wage employment loci,
Nordhaus [1970] for a discussion of price rules). In the absence of
asynchronization, these rules would clearly not imply nominal price inertia
and would be consistent with neutrality of money. However, in the presence
of asynchronization, they have two implications: the first is that, even
if spot labor and output supply schedules were upward sloping, relative
prices may be inflexible and lead,with asynchronization, to substantial
price level inertia. The second is that although on average prices and
wageswill satisfy price and wage rules, firms and workersmay not be supplying
theamounttheywould like. Inparticular, after a decrease in money, firms
willwant to supply more than they can at the prevailing mark up andthus
the economy maybein a regime similar to a Keynesian regime.
Thus,to generate thephenomena described by disequilibrium models,
weneed two sets of assumptions. The first and probably hardest to justify
is that relative prices be more inflexible than would be implied by the
equality of spot supply and demand. The second is the presence of
asynchronization which gives price level inertia as the result of the
rigidity of real wages and mark ups.4—l 7—
Section IV. Movements in Relative Prices
In the above model,afteran increase in money and at the initial
level of wages and prices, firms want a higher markup,workers a higher
real wage. Along the path of adjustment the outcome is a draw and the
real wage, except for oscillations, remains constant. Will it remain
the case, when a larger menu of goods is introduced that, except for
oscillations, there are no movements in relative prices, or should we
expect systematic distortions in the structure of relative prices in
response to nominal distuzbances? The answer is interesting both in
itself and because it provides for ways of testing this class of models.
The initial model can be extended by increasing the number of outputs
and inputs, and by examining the effects of differences in lengths of time
between price decisions across markets. I shall only consider the first
extension, through three examples.









=> p=- w.Ew (14) n. 1i=l
=
(p_wi)+y (15)
Definitions are the same as before. The supply of an input is an increasing
function of its real price. Output is produced from n inputs according to—18—
a Cobb Douglas technology,under constant returns toscale, Equations (14)
and (15) give the implications of competition and unconstrained profit
maximization; equation (14) gives the price as a weighted average of input
prices and is implied by the zero profit condition. The level of output
supply is then indeterminate; given any level of output, input demand is
given by (15). before, input suppliers choose input prices to equalize
input supply and derived input demand:
s d -l = => b.(w.— p) =(p-w.)+c(m—p)
>w.—p=(l_O)(m_p) (l÷b(l—c))/(l+b)






Equations(14) and (16) are identical to those used in the previous
section (under constant returns). Thus, when the same structureof a—
synchronization is introduced, similar results arise: The"real wage",
w—p, oscillates around its equilibriumvalue. From (17), however, this is
not true of "product wages" (wi- p). Inputs for which supplyis more
elastic (0. >0)have a lower relative price during the adjustment process
following an increase in money. There is therefore a systematicdistortion
in the structure of relative prices.
The second example is a model with one input and many outputs.
In addition to generating systematic distortions inthe structure of prices,
it also shows what other factors than supply elasticities affect the degree




y. =a9. i=l,...,n ;a<1
>y=(a/(l—a))(pS— w) i=l,. ..
= (l/(l—a))(p.- w) i=l. ..
Thereis a commonlabormarket where laborsupplyis a function of
the real wage. The demand for output i is a function of real money balances
andofits price relative to the price level. Production of output i is
carried Out under decreasing returns. Notional output supply and labor
demandare functions of product wages.
Wage setters choose the wage so as to equalize labor supply and
derived labor demands. Thus (ignoring the difference between sum of logs
and log of sums...):
=>b(w-p)=a1c(m—p) c (18)




Aggregating over outputs gives:
(a/(l—a)) (p—w) =c(m—p) (20)
p)=((l_a)/(a+d(l_a)))(c—c)(m—p) (21)—20—
Equations(18) and (20) are again identical to those used in the
previous section. Thus, with the same structure of asynchronization,
the real wage will remain on average constant following a change in money.
From (21), however, this is not true of relative prices. Outputs with low
demand elasticity with respect to money balances will have a lower relative
price during the process of adjustment to an increase in money.
As there is no asynchronization between output price decisions
and because of our assumption of perfect competition, the parameter d,
which characterizes the degree of substitutability between outputs,
plays no role in the determination of the path of the price level and the
real wage. To see what asynchronization between price decisions imply,
consider the case where there are two price setters, with prices p1, p2.
From above we can express their price as a function of m, w and the
other price:
a 1 )—l(a 1 =( j—+-(d+c.) w +c.m+-(d—c.)p.j 1,3= 1,2
Giventhe prices p1 and p2, we can solve for the nominal wage w from (18).
Replacing w in the above equation and rearranging gives:
p.=Op.+(1—0.) i,j =1,2
where0. (a—cb+(l—a) (d_c))/(a+cb+ (1_a) (d÷c.))I =1,2
This system in (p1, p2) has the same structure as the original
system in (w, p). Thus given asynchronization of price decisions for
p2,similar results follow and the degree of price level inertia
dependson 01 and °2Theparameter d plays an izrortant role. Ifa
isless than unity, then the higher d, the closer and 02 to unity,—21—
the slower the adjustment of nominal prices. (The model presented here
is close to onedevelopedby Akerlof (1969].
The previous two examples show that if demand or supply elasticities
differ across inputs or outputs, relative prices or wages will be distorted
during the process of adjustment. The last example shows that asynchroniza-
tion itself maycreatedistortions in the structure of relative prices.
Returning to the initial model, assume that production is now carried out
in n steps, each under constant returns to scale. The model then becomes






Theoutput of step i is denoted y.. The primary input is denoted
y0,finaloutput y. The supply of primaryinputdepends on its price
relative to the price of final output, the price level p. Technology
exhibits constant returns to scale. The implied zero profit condition is
that all prices be equal (up to constants which have been left out). In the
absence of asynchronization, primary input setters choose the input price




Each intermediate input setter in turn chooses its price such that
=i—l—22—
Assume now that the structure of price decisions is asynchronized
in the following way: input producers with i even take price decisions
at even times, input producers with i odd take price decisions at odd times.
Thus, again, all prices are revised after two periods. Given that structure,
the effect of a permanent, unanticipated increase in money at t =0,is
particularly easy to trace if bc =1,as in this case (22) implies p0 =m.
This case corresponds to 0 =0,in the model of Section I; in that model,
if 0 =0,the price level and nominal wage adjust fully to their new
equilibrium value within two periods. Table 2 gives the cross—section
time series characterization of the effects of money on prices in the
case where n =20.Two results emerge which did not in the simpler model:
The first, which is not the focus of this section, is that the
degree of price level inertia is a function of the number of price
decisions: it takes n periods, where n is the number of price decisions,
for the price level p to reach its new equilibrium value. The second
is that, although each price setter (for i =1,...,n) realizes on average
a zero mark up for each period during which its price is fixed, the
structure of relative prices is distorted. The relative price of inputs
early in the chain of production increases on average compared to the
price level.—23--
Table 2
Structure of Prices Afteran Increasein Money:
Time: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Prices:
p0
1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
p1
.0 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
p2
5 1. 1. 1. 1. 1.
p3
.0 .75 .75 1. 1. 1. 1.
p4
.375 .375 .875 .875 1. 1. 1.
p5
.0 .625 .625 .937 .937 1. 1.
p6
.312 .312 .782 .782 .968 .968 1.
p8
.273 .273 .711 .711 .929 .929 .992
S
p10
.246 .246 .656 .656 .890 .890 .977
S
p12
.225 .225 .612 .612 .853 .853 .959
• S S S • S • S • S S S S S S S
p20
.176 .176 .498 .498 .738 .738 .886






The argument of the paper has been the following: The first effect
of a movement in aggregate demand is to make initial relative prices
mutually inconsistent. After a decrease in money, all relative prices are
"too high"; they are all "too low" after an increase in money. In the
presenceof asynchronization, pressure on relative prices leads to a
decrease of nominal prices in the first case, an increase of nominal prices
inthe second case. Ifpressure on relative prices is weak, the return to
equilibriumis slow.
We have, however, relied until now on a mechanical asynchronization
structure. Although this may be acceptable to characterize the movement
of prices under a given regime, it prevents us from predicting the
dynamic effects of a change in regime, such as for example a sudden
decelleration of money growth. To do so requires a theory of
asynchronization itself. Even if agents find it optimal to choose a
fixed lengthbetween price decisions (an assumption we shall examine
below), they certainly have the choice as tothe timing of such decisions.
In the examples above,wagesettersprobably have an incentive to
synchronizedecisions with price setters by shifting decisions from odd
to even times: the asynchronization is not stable and might well disappear
over time. Can we therefore construct asynchronization structures which
would be stable in this sense? Consider the following two examples:
The first relies on the existence of a large number of price decisions,
the second on the existence of two types of disturbances.
In the first, suppose thereare many types—moreprecisely,
a continuum —ofoutputs, each of them produced from many types —again,
a continuum —ofinputs. Input price decisions are taken discretely—25—
and staggeredover time so that the number of price decisions per unit
timeis constant; if input cost shares are equal, output producers who also
take decisions discretely are therefore indifferent to the timing of their
decision. Suppose that output price decisions are also staggered over time
so that the number of output price decisions per unit time is constant.
Thus input price setters, who are also the consumers, are indifferent to
when they take their price decisions. This structure of asynchronization
is stable: given the timing of other agents' decisions, no one has an
incentive to change his own. It is, however, a knife edge stability.
If a firm or a worker changes his timing, then all others have an
incentive to do so until all decisions are synchronized.
The second example relies on the existence of two types of
disturbances, aggregate and idiosyncratic. Let's first relax the assumption
of a constant time interval between price decisions; the optimal rule is
indeed more likely to be an (s,S) rule rather than a fixed length rule,
implying that the time between decisions is random rather than constant
(Sheshinski and Weiss rl9sl] have looked at pricing decisions in this
context. If price setters follow (s,S) rules, and if disturbances were
only idiosyncratic,changes in prices would beindependent of each other
and asynchronization would remain. If there are both idiosyncratic and
aggregate disturbances, but if the size of idiosyncratic disturbances
islarge compared to that of aggregate disturbances, the above argument
suggests that some asynchronization may remain. This line of reasoning
6,7 is, however, difficult to formalize and is left for future research.
The other task left for future research is a test of the model;
the approach of the paper is only one of many which attempt to explain
the effects of money on econoinid activity. A stringent test of its—26—
relevance is a test of its implications for the joint behavior of relative
andnominalprices. This will extend work by Fischer [1981], Taylor [1981],
Marquez and Vining [1982] among others.—27—
Appendix. Derivation of Prices and Wages
I first solve for Pt for a general process for money, and then
for the path of prices and wages corresponding to the path of money
described in the text.
Using equation (11) for both t—l and t+l, taking E(wt÷it) using
iterated expectations and replacing in equation (10) gives:
Pt = a pt2+E(pt!t_l) +Pt+E(plt))+ (Al)




Equation(Al) must be solved in two steps. The first is to solve
for E(pt t_i), the second for Taking expectations on both sides of
(Al) conditional on information available at t-l and rearranging gives:
E °t-2 +(2aG_4)p+G®p2
=- It-i). (A2)
Let A be the smallest root of:
ox2+ (2a0-4)A + a®=0
It is given by:
A=(1-(l-aG)'2) /
This root is an increasing function of a®, equal to 0 for a® =0and to
1 for a® =1.Solving equation (A2) by factorization, subject to the
condition that Pt does not explode, gives:—28—
E(pt_l) =t-2+ (A/aO) AE(+2.It-i) (Ad)
Thelast step is to solve for Deriving E(p+2It) from (3)
andreplacingE(pt+21t) and E(ptjt_l) in (Al) gives
(4_G0(i+A))p =oOt2 + t + xA(E(Pt+2.It-i)+ E(1+2.+2 It))
Inow consider a specific path for money. inincreasesat t =0
from zero to unity; the increase is unanticipated and permanent.
To solve for the price level path, note that for t >0,there is
no remaining uncertainty and thus equation (A3) holds for actual values
of p and iratherthan for their expectations. Noting also that for t >0:
=(1-A)
wehave:
=Ap+(1-A) for t >0
This gives in particular, for t=0,p2 as a function of p0. Equation (Al)





=GOp2 + (l-) +G(l-0).
Solvingthe two equations in p0 and p2 givesthe following characteriza-
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0(1+X1) -1> (14-(1_0®)V2) -1=(l_o®)h/'2> 0
=>x <0 t+2Foothotes
1.Equation (10)follows from the assumption that the expected geometric
averageprice over the two periods must be the same under synchroniza-
tion and asynchronization. A theoretically more appealing assumption
is that the expected arithmetic average profit must be the same
under synchronization and asynchronization. This leads, however,
to a less tractable specification, which differs from the specification
in the text in three ways:
As firms are most of the time off their notional supply curve,
theprice has to beon average higher than under synchronization
tomaintain the same level of average profit.
Theweights onthe two periodsmay not be equal, but will in
generaldepend on the expectedlevels of demand in both periods.
Finally,the covariance between wages and nominal money will
appear in the price equation.
These three points can be made clearer by deriving the price
equation which would follow from imposing a zero arithmetic average
profit condition, in the case of constant returns to scale (cr =1).






=1/2w1 +1/2E(w1) in the text.2. The precise statement is that the average supply by workers (firms)
isconsistent with the average real wage (mark up) where "average"
is the geometric average over each two period interval during which
nominal wages (nominal prices) are fixed.
3. This result is similar to that obtained in imperfect information
models, where money may affect output andemploymentbut where agents
execute their desired trades at the perceived relative prices.
4. This suggests that explaining the behavior of relative prices,
quite apart from nominal rigidities should be high on the research
agenda. This appears indeed to have been the approach followed in
the 1960's (as summarized by Tobin [1970)). Research was focused
on documenting and explaining the inflexibility of mark ups, on
documenting andexplainingthe slow and small reaction of wages to
unemployment, the slope of the short-run Phillips curve. Nominal
price and wage inertia was then obtained not from explicit
asynchronization, but from assumptions about price andwageexpectations.
5. Similar problems of stability of the asynchronization structure
arise in another class of models. These models characterize the
effects of money on activity when decisions about when to shift from
interest bearing assets into money are asynchronized (Rotemberg [19821
andGrossmanandweiss[1982]).
6. Twootherexplanations have been suggested for asynchronization.
The first is that asynchronization allows for a more efficient
utilization of information in price decisions. The second is that
asynchronization may be the outcome of a game between price setters;
it is sontimes used to explain the timing structure of labor contracts.
These have not, to my knowledge, been formalized.7. Aninterestingattempt to explain asy2lchronization, which relies
ontwo types of disturbances and a Nashequilibrium concept has been
developedbyFethke and Policano [1982]. The structure of their
model is, however, quite different from the one presented in the
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